services/resources, all time accessibility and less resources Abstract-Electronic negotiation (e-negotiation) is a major allocation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. activity in e-Commerce applications. Agent-based e-negotiation
Index Terms-Security, E-Commerce, Mobile Agent, E-intruders and non-trusted hosts might perform any of the Negotiation.
fraudulent acts discussed in [7, 8, 10] .
In this paper, we address the security risks of information I. INTRODUCTION exchanged between negotiating mobile agents during the In emerging electronic markets and other types of online negotiating sessions. The negotiation process might go trading communities, e-negotiation is a fundamental process through many rounds before the final decision is taken which [1] . It enables complex trade interactions to find a mutually requires the mobile agents to exchange very sensitive acceptable agreement among trading partners. Therefore, information. Unfortunately, this information is susceptible to support for complex multi-attribute business negotiations is a various security risks. Therefore, the information exchanged critical success factor for the next generation of electronic between the mobile agents during e-negotiation has to be markets and, more generally, for all types of electronic protected so trading partners can have trust in electronic exchanges.
markets and business. To the best of our knowledge, this An e-negotiation is a joint decision-making process of two problem has not been addressed sufficiently. or more parties within an electronic market. An electronic
In this paper, we propose a security protocol that safeguards market is an application that is based on electronic the information exchanged in the course of e-negotiation communication services and that supports the market processes by the agents acting on behalf of the trading coordination of economic activities. The negotiation process is partners. The aim of the proposed security protocol is to an iterative process that represents a multi-criteria preserve privacy, authenticity, anonymity, non-repudiation, optimization process where every entity tries to maximize its and strong integrity of the exchanged data during negotiation social welfare within the predefined constraints [1] . Several rounds. It ensures that decisions taken by negotiating agents to negotiation sessions might take place before the final decision be based on genuine data and would result in the following is taken and the initiator commits to the winning vendor. agreements, error-free calculations, timely delivery of agents in the course of e-negotiation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief discussion of the security threats to information 978-1 -4244-1 835-0/07/$25.00 ©2007 IEEE exchanged between agents during e-negotiation is Nevertheless, the security protocols presented in the literature presented. The proposed protocol is described in details in mainly address the security of the information gathered by Section 3. A brief analysis of the proposed protocol is given in search agents, security of agent mediated on-line auctions, Section 4. The conclusions and future direction is discussed in privacy of negotiation strategies, security of bank transactions Section 5. and privacy of decision making functions [1, 4] . In contrast, we focus on the security of information exchanged by II. THREAT MODEL negotiating agents. During negotiation, agents are expected to run in partially unknown and untrustworthy environments. This renders the mobile agents susceptible to various security risks. In this
In this section, we discussed mobile agent-based on-line section, we will discuss these risks with emphases on the trading framework. First, we will discuss the reference risks associated with the data exchanged by the negotiating architecture and its various components used in the paper. The agents.
negotiation process is also discussed. We will then discuss the The security of information exchanged by negotiating security proposed security protocol that aims to protect the agents has six requirements: (a) privacy of negotiated issues; information exchanged between the negotiating mobile agents. their tasks from the start to the completion of the e-negotiation merchant that seeks to sell an advertised product for the highest price offered. Customers submit bids on the product at processes. on-line auctions and the negotiation continues till no higher executed. Also, we assume that each vendor poses two c. Payment/purchase-related attacks that include tampering encryption keys, a public key and a private signing key. The with a payment/purchase order and spying out the
1identity of the signer of a message can be deduced from a initiator's bank account details; and spying out and/or tamper with parameters to negotiate with short d sintradthpulic e fahstcabe fud in the vendors.
iste~~~~~~~server's known-hosts list or iS distributed to a host upon Thus, it is fundamental to ensure the security of information reusfomteelvnhs.
' . . . .
.~~~~~~~~~T he proposed protocol uses three mobile agents: controller exchanged during e-negotiation, particularly the negotiated agn.C).okragn W) n tneayrgsr gn parameters. In order to prevent or at least detect malicious acts (R) h eal fteeaet r sflos of adversaries, different security measures have to be in place.
* The controller agent (CA) -stores the critical data (e.g., offer vector, expiry time of the bid) and critical functions would collect the best offers from the short listed vendors in (e.g., scoring functions, decision functions, and tactic step (3) and then it migrates to the trusted host for decryption, function). verification, sorting, and decision making purposes. Next, it * The worker agent (WA) -stores the non-critical data in a communicates with the winning vendor Vw that offers the tuple S and functions such as part of the tactic function.
most suitable package in step (4) and further negotiates with * The itinerary registry agent (IRA) -stores the addresses of it. It sends it a purchase order and Alice's personal details to the visited vendors in a vector Z and the time t at which the Vendor Vw in step (4). Then, it sends a payment order in step agent got executed at the respective vendor's host.
(5) to Alice's bank service on behalf of Alice. Next, the bank Negotiation process involves evaluation, ranking of the processes the payment in step (6) to vendor Vw. Next, vendor submitted offers, and generating a short list of vendors to Vw proceeds on confirming the booking of the ticket for Alice negotiate specific parameters to gain the most social welfare. in step (7). Finally, Alice sends an acknowledgement to Mobile agents might negotiate for terms of contracts, vendor Vw on issuing the ticket. Note that the security allocation of complex tasks, and cooperation between requirements of information gathered by search agents are different mobile agents in the marketplace, services/resource, different from the security requirements of information and parameters of received proposals. Negotiation between exchanged by negotiating agents. The search agent traverses agents allows cooperative and competitive sharing of the Internet searching for particular information and returns to information. The negotiation can be single attribute the initiator with some results. The security requirements are negotiations such as the purely price-based negotiation or to maintain integrity, privacy, authenticity, and nonmulti-attribute negotiation that considers multiple parameters repudiation of collected offers. Whereas, negotiating agent has such as price, quality of service, shipping fees, payment to analyze and evaluate submitted offers autonomously, method, warranty, etc.
negotiate certain parameters with vendors and other agents, An initiator host starts a negotiating session with an offer and consummate the deal on the consumer's behalf without the request with the initiator's preferences, constraints and a need to return to the initiator. The negotiation might go closing time for bid. This achieved by instantiating the three through many rounds of negotiation and it is fundamental to mobile agents (CA, WA and IRA). These mobile agents are ensure the security of negotiated parameters with the different engaged in search for offers by visiting the vendor hosts. We short listed vendors and submitted offers. assume that agents migrate through public channels and Fig. 1 , the proposed into two agents, the controller and the worker respectively [6] . fring the three agents(.eAsown in Fig. 1 , the Ropsd Vendors sumi thi offers to meet theinitiator's protocol has three rounds (i.e., Round dates. She deploys a negotiating agent in step (1) and provides with the public key of the trusted host. The offer is appended it with the request parameters including the deadline of RIO to the offer vector X at the CA. Next, it provides the itinerary The negotiation agent then dispatches the three agents: CA registry agent with a partial itinerary details signed by its WA, an IA to serc th maktlc fr ofrs fro private key and encrypted with the public key of the trusted various vendors. Each vendor provides the negotiating agent host. The partial itinerary is appended to the itinerary registry with its encrypted offer. Then, the agent in step (2) migrates to vector Z at the IRA. The itinerary registry agent would then a trusted host where it decrypts, verifies, evaluates, and sorts scramble the elements of the vector. Finally, the last host in offers securely. The agent might go for a second round of the agent's itinerary dispatches the three agents to the trusted negotiation with two or more of the competing vendors with host where the information collected by the three agents the intension of gaining the most social welfare for Alice. It would be integrated for verification, evaluation, and sorting purposes.
itinerary registry vector Z at the itinerary registry agent. The At a trusted host, the CA decrypts the tuple W it stores with agent would then scramble the elements of the vector. Finally, its private decryption key. Then, it deduces the identity of the the host dispatches the three agents to the trusted host where initiator host of the agent and computes a hash of the deduced the data collected by the three agents would be integrated for identity. Next, it verifies if the received offers (i) are verification, sorting, and decision making purposes. submitted to the initiator of its agent, (ii) meet the initiator's When the three agents arrive at the trusted host, the preferences defined in the Request for Offer (RFO) it stores; controller agent performs the same task as in the first round (iii) belong to the protocol run identified by the random nonce for the new offer vector. In addition, it verifies if the offers r. (iv) verifies if the expiry time of each offer tn is longer than meet the negotiated parameters of interest of the agent and if the expiry time of the bid it stores t. the expiry time of each offer is longer than the expiry time of
If any of the verification fails, it excludes the offer. the bid it stores. The steps at the trusted host of the first round Otherwise, the CA decrypts the itinerary registry vector Z of protocol are repeated to assemble the agent's new itinerary stored with the itinerary registry agent with its private according to their execution time at negotiated hosts. decryption key. Next, it verifies if the vector relates to its
The CA will then run the decision functions to decide on agent by verifying if the hash stored with the elements of the the winning vendor from which service/resources will be vector matches the computed hash and the nonce stored with bought. Once the preferred host is selected, the CA generates the elements of the vector matches the nonce it stores. If the a purchase order that includes the bank account details of the verifications are fulfilled, the CA assembles the agent's initiator host (i.e., consumer). It then signs the order with its itinerary according to their execution time at visited hosts private key and encrypts it with the public key of the winning (vendors). Next, it verifies if the assembled itinerary matches vendor. Finally, the trusted host dispatches the WA with the the itinerary it would deduce from the offer vector. If the two purchase order as a commitment to the offer of the winning itineraries do not match it indicates that the collected offers vendor and seeks acceptance from the winning vendor's host. have been tampered with. Hence, it discards the agent's search results. If the two itineraries match, it indicates that strong 3) Third Round integrity is accomplished.
The final round in the negotiation process involves issuing The CA evaluates the offers using scoring functions and a payment order to the winning vendor upon her/his ranks the offers to produce a set of short listed vendors. It also acceptance of the purchase order. When the winning vendor runs decision functions to generate a new RFO for each short host receives the WA from the trusted host, it would respond listed vendor encrypted with public key of the respective to the trusted host by sending an acceptance or rejection vendor and stores them in vector U. The new offer includes message. If the accepts the purchase order, the CA (at the particular parameters the agent intends to negotiate with each trusted host), sends a message of payment order to the vendor. The CA generates a vector H that stores the particular consumer's Bank host. The message is signed by the private parameters the agent intends to negotiate with each short listed key of the trusted host and encrypted with the public key of vendor, a nonce, hashing of the identity of the initiator, and the bank service. Finally, at the winning vendor's host, the new closing time of bid encrypted with its public encryption vendor receives the payment and then provides key. It stores the vector for later verifications. Finally, the service/resource to the initiator host. trusted service dispatches the three agents to the first host (vendor) in the short listed vendors to negotiate.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we reason the correctness of the proposed 2) Second Round protocol in the presence of the various fraudulent acts by an In this round, the three agents will visit the short listed hosts adversary (i.e., intruders and malicious hosts) as discussed in (i.e., vendors) to negotiate particular parameters with each of section 2. However, due to restrictions on the number of the short listed vendors, evaluating new offers, running pages, we will only give a brief discussing. For details, decision functions to decide on the winning vendor, and interested readers could refer to [9] . generating purchase order.
When each of the short listed host receives the CA, WA A. Security analysis and IRA, the host performs the following steps: First, it The security of negotiation is of concern to both vendors executes the worker agent, decrypts the new Request for Offer and consumers. We now show that the proposed protocol can and learns the parameters the agent wishes to negotiate Then, achieve the aimed for security properties as follows.
it provides its new offer signed by its private key and encrypted with the public key of the trusted host. The offer is Claim 1: The proposed protocol ensures strong integrity.
appended the offer vector X at the controller agent. Next, it updates the itinerary registry agent with a partial itinerary Proof: One way an adversary could violate the integrity of details signed by its private key and encrypted with the public the data exchanged is by tampering with parameters of key of the trusted host. The partial itinerary is appended to the Request for Offer (FRO), bid closing time, identity of initiator, random nonce identifying a protocol run, collected offers, parameters to negotiate with short listed vendors, Proof: Without proper countermeasures, an intruder might payment and purchase orders at the controller and worker intercept an offer signed by a vendor, strips off the signature agents respectively. As the parameters: Request for Offer and then signs it with its private key. Hence, the offer would (FRO), bid closing time, identity of initiator, random nonce be erroneously authenticated by the trusted host. The proposed identifying a protocol run are stored with the controller agent protocol prevents this from occurring as the vendor signs the for later verifications, any tampering with parameters could be offer it submits and then encrypts it with the public key of the easily detected. Also, collected offers, parameters to negotiate trusted host. Hence, an intruder would not be able to sign with each vendor, payment and purchase orders are stored other vendor's offers by its private key. The trusted host would encrypted at the worker agent, and thus tempering with these receive offer signed by the genuine vendors. would show that the host is visited twice during a negotiation * The offer Is generated for the genune intiator of its round and it is inadmissible. agent.
* The offer meets the initiator's preferences defined in the Claim 2: The proposed protocol ensures non-repudiation.
RFO it stores and the values of parameters negotiated during the second round of protocol.
Proof: The threat to the non-repudiation includes * The offer belongs to the protocol run identified by the appending a fake offer and then repudiates it or sending a random nonce r. purchase or payment order and then repudiates it. The * The expiry time of each offer tj is longer than the expiry proposed protocol prevents these threats from being time of the bid it stores t'. materialized as vendor has to sign its offer with its private key B. Efficiency analysis and the trusted host has to sign payment/ purchase orders with
The proposed protocol does not require complex and its private key. Computing Systems FTDCS'99, 1999. verify the protocol formally using formal verification methods such as Symbolic Trace Analyzer (STA), SPIN model checker or Mur(p and prove that the proposed protocol is free of security attacks. We also made a number of assumptions such as the agent's code remains intact throughout the agent's itinerary. We will extend the proposed protocol when these assumptions are relaxed.
